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Positive Obligations and Criminal Justice: 
Duties to Protect or Coerce? 
Liora Lazarus1 
Andrew Ashworth’s prodigious body of work on criminal law, criminal law theory 
and sentencing theory has more recently been complemented by a relatively newer 
strand of enquiry on the relationship between criminal law, criminal justice and 
human rights.2  I have been privileged to co-teach two graduate courses with 
Professor Ashworth on this area. The relationship between human rights, criminal law 
and criminal justice is relatively under-explored, as it requires an intimate knowledge 
of more than one field of law. Few are better placed than Ashworth.   
Ashworth’s scholarship in this area is wide ranging, and he has produced a body of 
work which provides a framework within which to balance respect for human rights 
and the pursuit of safety and security, or ‘the reduction of harm and reduction of the 
risk of harm’,3 through the criminal law.  Much of his work has focused on unearthing 
the human rights safeguards aimed at constraining coercive activity through criminal 
procedure. He has sought to outline the ways in which habeas corpus and fair trial 
rights can be used as principles to regulate the criminal process as a whole, and to 
tame the excesses of political pursuits of security and public protection.4 But in his 
more recent work, Ashworth acknowledges that while ‘the constraints imposed by the 
1 Fellow in Law, St. Anne’s College, Oxford. My thanks must go to Julia Lowis for her excellent case 
research work in support of this chapter, and to Miles Jackson and the editors of this volume for their 
feedback.  All errors are my own. 
2 Some examples include: A Ashworth, Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (Sweet 
& Maxwell 2002); A Ashworth and B Emmerson, Human Rights and Criminal Justice 2001; A 
Ashworth, 'Criminal Law, Human Rights and Preventative Justice' in B McSherry, A  Norrie and S 
Bronitt (eds), Regulating Deviance: the Redirection of Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2009); A Ashworth and D van Zyl Smit, 'Disproportionate Sentences as Human 
Rights Violations' (2004) 67 MLR, 541-560; A Ashworth, 'Criminal Procedure, Human Rights and 
Balance' in T Elholm et al (ed), Ikke kun Straf: Festskrift til Vagn Greve (Jurist- og Okonomforbundets 
Forlag 2008); A Ashworth, 'Security, Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights' in B J Goold and L 
Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2007); A Ashworth, 'Criminal Justice 
Reform: Principles, Human Rights and Public Protection' (2004) Crim LR, 516-532; A Ashworth and 
M Strange, 'Criminal Law and Human Rights' (2004) European Human Rights Law Review, 121-140. 
3 A Ashworth, 'Criminal Law, Human Rights and Preventative Justice' in B McSherry, A Norrie and S 
Bronitt (eds), Regulating Deviance: the Redirection of Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2009). 
4Ashworth, Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (n 2 above). 
2
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are significant in relation to criminal 
procedure’, they are ‘slightly less significant in matters of sentencing and not 
extensive at all in the criminal law itself’.  He is led to conclude that the ‘Convention 
leaves large gaps in the normative coverage, having nothing to say on major issues’.5   
As a consequence, Ashworth, whose concern is with the unjustified expansion of the 
criminal law, seeks to develop human rights principles to underpin a ‘liberal theory of 
criminalisation’ based on the principle of harm.6  He, along with Lucia Zedner, is 
right to be worried about the spread of the preventative justice model of criminal law 
and the potential for coercive overreach.7 Ashworth’s use of human rights (in 
particular rights under the ECHR) is thus directed to the limitation of the preventative 
measures that have proliferated in recent years.  His focus on the limiting powers of 
rights such as liberty (Article 5 ECHR) and fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) is at the core 
of this project. 
What I propose to do in this chapter is to explore the relationship between criminal 
law, criminal process and human rights from a slightly different perspective. I will 
seek to demonstrate that while human rights may well be used to limit the excesses of 
security and law and order politics, the nature of the relationship between human 
rights and criminal justice cannot be captured alone by the view of rights as a limit on 
the coercive reach of the criminal law and criminal justice institutions.  Increasingly, 
human rights, cast as positive rights, have resulted in claims for the extension of the 
criminal law, the creation of preventative duties or ‘protective policing measures’,8 
for the intensification of policing and prosecution of sexual and violent crimes in 
particular, and threats to security or public protection in general.    
The story is a complex one which is intimately linked to the growing international 
acceptance of human rights as including positive rights, and hence a shift from a 
conception of rights as a limitation on State action to one which now views rights as 
5Ashworth, 'Criminal Law, Human Rights and Preventative Justice' (n 2 above) 87, 93.  
6 Ashworth, 'Criminal Law, Human Rights and Preventative Justice') (n 2 above) 87, 94. 
7 A Ashworth and L Zedner, 'Just Prevention: preventive rationales and the limits of the criminal law' 
in RA Duff & S Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Criminal Law (OUP, 2011). 
8 A Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Oxford, 2004) 15. 
3
demands for such action.9  The result is a process whereby the human rights of those 
subject to harm - such as the right to life, the right against torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, the right to private life, the right against discrimination, and the 
right to security - have now combined to create what I argue are most accurately 
described as coercive duties on the State to criminalize, prevent, police and prosecute 
harmful acts.  In short, I want to suggest that human rights may have more to say on 
the big questions of normative coverage of the criminal law than Ashworth accepts, 
and as a consequence we need to remain vigilant about the direction of positive duties 
which require coercive action from the State.   
This trend is not only located within the jurisprudence of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, but is found within international law, as well as domestic constitutions 
and constitutional adjudication around the world. 10  Any account that seeks to 
adequately capture the relationship between criminal law, justice and human rights 
will have to account for the ambiguity that human rights present:  both as limiting 
coercion by the State and as requiring it.  Moreover, accounts by human rights 
lawyers of the benefits of positive rights and duties in general,11 need to take account 
of the coercive potential which arises out of the logic of positive rights claims and 
rhetoric in relation to the criminal law. 
9 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP, 2008); A 
Mowbray, (n 8 above) See also discussion in Lazarus et al, The Evolution of Fundamental Rights 
Charters and Case Law: A Comparison of the United Nations, Council of Europe and European Union 
Systems (2011) European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies, Part A. 
10 International human rights treaties have always protected positive rights, in particular socio-
economic and cultural rights.   The language of ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ suffuses the 
various rights instruments, implying that even civil and political rights are not merely negative 
protections against the State.  The political struggle for the equal recognition of economic, social and 
cultural rights gained particular impetus at the 1993 Vienna World Conference and has been consistent 
since then.  See:  L Lazarus et al The Evolution of Fundamental Rights Charters and Case Law ((2011) 
European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies).  The ECtHR is by no means the 
pioneer regional court on the development of positive rights. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights laid out the basis for positive duties and due diligence requirement 20 years before this in 
Velasquez-Rodriquez v Honduras, judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4. At the 
domestic level, the German Federal Constitutional Court developed the notion of positive duties even 
earlier in the 1970s (E Friesenhahn 'Der Wandel des Grundrechtsverständnisses' in Verhandlungen des 
50. Deutschen Juristentages (Beck München 1974) G1; H H Rupp 'Vom Wandel der Grundrechte'
(1976) AöR 161).  This also relates to the concept of protective duties which were used to protect the
unborn foetus in 1975 (BVerfGE 39, 1).
11 A Mowbray, (n 8 above)J McBride, ‘Protecting Life:  a Positive Obligation to Help’ 24 (1999)
European Law Review Human Rights Survey HR/43; JG Merrills, The Development of International
Law by the European Court of Human Rights (MUP, 1993) 102f; K Starmer European Human Rights
Law (London, Legal Action Group 199) ch. 5; A Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere
(Oxford Clarendon Press, 1993).
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The chapter will start out by outlining key areas where positive rights claims have 
shaped the criminal law and criminal justice process.  It will then examine the 
relationship between positive rights and coercion and critique the language used to 
frame certain positive duties. Finally, the chapter will use the right to security as a 
case study through which to demonstrate the concerns raised by the development of 
coercive duties. 
Right to life and positive duties 
In a variety of jurisdictions, the right to life gives rise to positive duties that the State 
must fulfill in order to protect life. Here we will focus on the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In Osman v United Kingdom, the Court 
developed a wide-ranging general duty out of the right to life, which set aside the 
exclusionary rule in the UK preventing the police from being held liable in negligence 
claims for failure to investigate crime.12  According to the ECtHR, a State has a 
general duty to individuals to protect the right to life.  It is required to legislate 
‘effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the 
person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and 
sanctioning of breaches of such provisions’.13   
Given that the specific duties of the State in these cases are also related to tortious 
liability, the ECtHR acknowledges that it cannot place ‘an impossible or 
disproportionate burden on the authorities’ as it has to keep ‘bearing in mind the 
difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human 
conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and 
resources’.14  It also notes that ‘another relevant consideration is the need to ensure 
that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner which 
fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints 
on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice, 
12 Osman v. United Kingdom, Application 23452/94 (2000) 29 EHRR 245. 
13 Osman [115]. 
14 Osman [116] 
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including the guarantees contained in Articles 5 [right to liberty] and 8 [right to 
private life] of the Convention’.15 
As a consequence, ‘not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a 
Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from 
materialising’.16  Hence, States are only under a specific obligation ‘in certain well-
defined circumstances’ to take proactive ‘preventive operational measures to protect 
an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another’.17  This specific 
obligation only arises where ‘the authorities knew or ought to have known of the 
existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual, and that 
they failed to take measures within their powers which, judged reasonably, might 
have been expected to avoid that risk’.18 This delimited specific duty is clearly framed 
and informed by tortious notions of causation and responsibility.19 
Since Osman was decided, a range of cases have been brought to Strasbourg 
involving the specific positive duty arising under the right to life,20 and the question 
of whether the State has fulfilled the general positive duty.21  The cases where a 
breach of the general duty has been found have mostly centered on the State’s failure 
to properly investigate a death.22 This constitutes a breach of an ancillary procedural 
15 Osman [116]. 
16 Osman [116]. 
17 Osman [115]. 
18 Ibid [116]. 
19 D Fairgreave, State Liability in Tort:  A Comparative Law Study (OUP Oxford 2003); L Hoyano, 
'Policing Flawed Police Investigations: Unravelling the Blanket' (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 912-
936. 
20 Some examples include: LCB v UK Application 2341/94, (1998) 27 EHRR 212; Keenan v UK 
Application 27229/95, (2001) EHRR 242; Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia [2010] ECHR 25965/04 ; Kilic 
v Turkey Application 22492/93, (2001) 33 EHRR 1357; Mahmut Kaya v Turkey Application 22535/93 
(ECtHR 28 March 2000); Nuray Sen v Turkey Application 25354/94 (ECtHR 30 March 2004) ; Akkoc 
v Turkey Application 22947/93, (2002) 34 EHRR 51; Kontrova v Slovakia Application 7510/04 
(ECtHR 31 May 2007); Demiray v Turkey Application 27308/95 (ECtHR 21 November 2000); 
Oneryldiz v Turkey Application 48939/99, (2005) 41 EHRR 325. 
21 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia Application 25965/04 (ECtHR 7 Jan 2010); Kilic v Turkey Application 
22492/93, (2001) 33 EHRR 1357; Mahmut Kaya v Turkey Application 22535/93 (ECtHR 28 March 
2000); Nuray Sen v Turkey Application 25354/94 (ECtHR 30 March 2004); Akkoc v Turkey 
Application 22947/93 (2002) 34 EHRR 51; Shanaghan v UK Application 37715/97 (ECtHR 4 May 
2001); Nachova v Bulgaria Application 43577/98, (2004) 39 EHRR 793; Kontrova v Slovakia 
Application 7510/04 (ECtHR 31 May 2007); Demiray v Turkey Application 27308/95 (ECtHR 21 
November 2000); Mastromatteo v Italy Application 37703/97, [2002] ECHR 689 ; Calvelli v Ciglio v 
Italy Application 32967/96, 17 January 2002; Vo v France Application 53924/00, (2005) 40 EHRR 
259; Oneryldiz v Turkey Application 48939/99, (2005) 41 EHRR 325. 
22 Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria Application 55523/00 (26 July 2007); Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia 
Application 25965/04 (ECtHR 7 January 2010) ; Kilic v Turkey Application 22492/93, (2001) 33 
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obligation under Article 2 (right to life) to ‘conduct an effective investigation into the 
death and instigate criminal proceedings where necessary’.23 The duty to investigate 
supplements the general duty of the State to put in place criminal law and policing 
measures to prevent and deter violations of the right to life. In the ECtHR 
jurisprudence, breach of the investigative duty is particularly likely to be found where 
the State has failed to properly investigate a killing which may have been racially 
motivated, and which also engages Article 14 (prohibition on discrimination).24 The 
procedural obligation to investigate deaths also presupposes the setting-up of an 
efficient judicial system and in some circumstances recourse to criminal law.25 
Despite the potentially expansive scope of the general duty under Osman, the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence regarding the right to life has thus far given rise to clearly 
identifiable and delimited positive duties, which places the standard of fault very 
high. Given that murder is very likely to be criminalized, the general positive duties 
that have arisen out of this case law have dealt with serious deficiencies in the 
investigation, prosecution and trial flowing from deaths.  There are a number of cases 
where applicants have argued for the extension of the criminal law to acts resulting in 
death.26 In two cases of medical negligence, one dealing with the death of an unborn 
foetus,27 the Court held that civil law remedies were sufficient and that the right to life 
did not automatically require recourse to criminal law sanctions where breaches 
occur.  
But the threshold at which criminal law sanctions are required by Article 2, or at 
which sanctions should be imposed, is not always set this high. In Oneryildiz v Turkey 
EHRR 1357; Mahmut Kaya v Turkey Application 22535/93 (ECtHR 28 March 2000) ; Nuray Sen v 
Turkey Application 25354/94 (ECtHR 30 March 2004), ; Akkoc v Turkey Application 22947/93, (2002) 
34 EHRR 51; Kontrova v Slovakia Application 7510/04 (ECtHR 31 May 2007); Demiray v Turkey 
Application 27308/95 (ECtHR 21 November 2000). 
23 See on standards of the investigation: Keenan v UK Application 27229/95, (2001) EHRR 242; 
Jordan v UK Application 24746/94, (2003) 37 EHRR 2. 
24 Menson v UK Application 47916/99, 6 May 2003 ; Nachova v Bulgaria Application  43577/98, 
(2004) 39 EHRR 793; Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria Application 55523/00 (ECtHR 26 July 2007) ; but 
see Shanaghan v UK Application  37715/97 (ECtHR 4 May 2001), where the obligation to investigate 
possible racist overtones was not viewed as mandatory unless there was a real and legitimate concern 
of discriminatory practice.   
25 Vo v France Application 53924/00, (2005) 40 EHRR 259 ; Demiray v Turkey Application  27308/95 
(ECtHR 21 November 2000).  
26 Calvelli v Ciglio v Italy Application 32967/96, 17 January 2002; Vo v France Application 53924/00, 
(2005) 40 EHRR 259; Oneryldiz v Turkey Application 48939/99, (2005) 41 EHRR 325. 
27 Vo v France Application 53924/00, (2005) 40 EHRR 25 . 
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the State was held liable for being too lenient on local mayors whose ‘negligent 
omissions’ resulted in the death of a number of Turkish citizens where a rubbish 
dump collapsed on their shacks after a methane explosion.28 The mayors were held 
guilty of ‘negligent omissions in the performance of their duties’ (§230 of the Turkish 
Criminal Code) and given a suspended fine which was the lowest available penalty. 
The ECtHR took the view that the criminal provision in question did ‘not in any way 
relate to life-endangering acts or to the protection of the right to life within the 
meaning of Article 2’ and hence there was no ‘acknowledgment of any responsibility 
for failing to protect the right to life’. The Court argued further there was no ‘precise 
indication that the trial court had sufficient regard to the extremely serious 
consequences of the accident; the persons held responsible were ultimately sentenced 
to derisory fines, which were, moreover, suspended’.  As a consequence the ECtHR 
concluded: 
 ‘It cannot be said that the manner in which the Turkish criminal justice 
system operated in response to the tragedy secured the full accountability 
of State officials or authorities for their role in it and the effective 
implementation of provisions of domestic law guaranteeing respect for the 
right to life, in particular the deterrent function of the criminal law. In 
short, it must be concluded in the instant case that there has also been a 
violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect, on 
account of the lack, in connection with a fatal accident provoked by the 
operation of a dangerous activity, of adequate protection “by law” 
safeguarding the right to life and deterring similar life-endangering 
conduct in future’.29 
Oneryildiz is only one example of how the right to life can have an intensifying effect 
on the shape and implementation of the criminal law, on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, the conduct of a criminal trial, and on the type and gravity of sentence. 
There are other instances where the ECtHR has held that ordinary criminal law 
protections were not effective enough due to basic defects in the ambit and 
implementation of the criminal law. Many of these are very extreme cases in the 
south-east region of Turkey and concern the criminal law regulation of official 
28 Oneryldiz v Turkey Application 48939/99, (2005) 41 EHRR 325, paragraph 118. 
29 Oneryldiz v Turkey [116-117]. 
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killings of Kurds suspected of supporting the PKK.30  But not all successful 
applications are limited to such politically extreme circumstances.  In Kontrova v 
Slovakia,31 the ECtHR found the State in breach of the right to life where the police 
had failed to respond adequately to an initial complaint of domestic violence, which 
was directly related to the death of two children. In this case the ECtHR was 
particularly critical of the fact that ‘one of the officers involved assisted the applicant 
and her husband in modifying her criminal complaint of 2 November 2002 so that it 
could be treated as a minor offence calling for no further action’.32  This action, and 
other dereliction of police duties in response to the emergency calls of the applicant, 
were seen as leading directly to the death of the applicant’s two children and were key 
in the success of this application.  
The case law on the right to life is instructive in respect of how positive rights claims, 
most frequently arising out of tortious actions against the State, can shape the criminal 
law and its enforcement in a variety of circumstances. Later in this chapter, the 
broader implications of such duties will be explored. Suffice it to say, at this stage, 
that the rhetoric of positive duties in relation to the right to life is not confined to the 
court rooms.  Politicians and State actors are all aware of, and quick to deploy, a 
justification for an increasing range of preventive criminal law measures based on the 
right to life.  This is also mirrored in the language of the right to security in a range of 
jurisdictions and will be explored in a later part of this chapter.  In short, case law is 
one thing, it is another matter how States and governments translate the messages 
they are hearing from the ECtHR and other constitutional courts, and how they are 
incorporating these messages into the rhetoric of public protection.  The risk of 
coercive overreach may not lie then in the specific decisions of the Courts, but rather 
in the reception of the messages in question within a broader politics of security.  
Gender violence and positive duties 
Since the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
30 Mahmut Kaya v Turkey Application 22535/93 (ECtHR 28 March 2000), Kilic v Turkey, Application 
22492/93 (2001) 33 EHRR 1357 and Akkoc v Turkey Application 22947/93 (2002) 34 EHRR 51 held 
the transfer of jurisdiction to national security forces for terrorist crimes was incompatible with art.6. 
31 Kontrova v Slovakia Application 7510/04 (ECtHR 31 May 2007). 
32 Kontrova v Slovakia [54]. 
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Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the UN General Assembly, gender violence has 
been the subject of extensive international law activity.33  This includes the 19th 
General Recommendation of the CEDAW Committee,34 which notes that States 
should ‘take appropriate and effective measures to overcome all forms of gender-
based violence, whether by public or private act’ and ‘ensure that laws against family 
violence and abuse, rape, sexual assault and other gender-based violence give 
adequate protection to all women, and respect their integrity and dignity’.35  Similarly, 
the General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
(DEVW) enshrines a ‘due diligence’ standard and enjoins States to ‘pursue by all 
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women’ 
including: exercising ‘due diligence to prevent, investigate and in accordance with 
national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are 
perpetrated by the State or by private persons’.36 The international duty of due 
diligence with respect to the treatment of violence against women is also supported by 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in their Recommendation (2002) 
which obliges states to penalize all non-consensual sexual acts, including where the 
victim does not show resistance.37  
Much of this international activity is directed towards systemic reform of the 
treatment of victims of gender violence and could not be said to establish positive 
duties directed at the coercion of perpetrators of gender violence. Nevertheless, there 
is little question that the activities have led to an extension of the criminal law, and a 
strong intensification of the policing and prosecution of acts of gender violence. This 
was particularly evident in the case of MC v Bulgaria where the ECtHR declared 
itself: 
 
 … persuaded that any rigid approach to the prosecution of sexual offences, such 
as requiring proof of physical resistance in all circumstances, risks leaving certain 
types of rape unpunished and thus jeopardizing the effective protection of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 L Lazarus, ‘The Human Rights Framework Relating to the Handling, Investigation and Prosecution 
of Rape Complaints’, Annex A to the Stern Report on The Handling of Rape Complaints (2010). 
34 General Recommendation 19 of January 29, 1992. 
35 General Recommendation 19 of January 29, 1992, s 24. 
36 General Assembly Resolution 48/104 of 20 December 1993, Article 4. 
37 Recommendation No. R (2002) 5 adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 April 2002 and 
Explanatory Memorandum.  H/Inf (2004). 
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individual’s sexual autonomy.  In accordance with contemporary standards and 
trends in that area, the Member States’ positive obligations under Articles 3 
[prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment] and 8 of the Convention 
must be seen as requiring the penalisation and effective prosecution of any non-
consensual act, including the absence of physical resistance by the victim.38 
 
The international law obligations, soft law, and jurisprudence of the ECtHR have all 
played into domestic court interpretations of the right to sexual autonomy and rape.  
This is evident in both the South African and English cases which we will return to 
below.39 
 
Domestic Violence and Violence Against Children 
 
A number of decisions by the ECtHR have developed protective duties with respect to 
domestic violence and violence against children. Opuz v Turkey dealt with a pattern of 
domestic violence culminating in a murder.40  The authorities repeatedly failed to take 
special measures to protect the victims, on the grounds that they were limited by the 
applicable domestic law. Here the ECtHR incorporated a broader view of the 
discriminatory nature of violence against women.  The decision, which was heavily 
influenced by the CEDAW committee’s work and the Recommendations of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, declared that the ineffectiveness of 
domestic remedies and the failure to take pre-emptive protective measures in relation 
to domestic violence constituted a violation of Article 14 as well as Articles 2 and 3 
(prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment) in this context. The Court 
was highly critical of the authorities failure to properly consider the risks and threats 
that the offender posed.  It rejected the Government’s arguments that there was no 
‘tangible evidence’ that the life of the victim was in danger.41 The Court noted that no 
attempt had been made to balance the risks and consider the proportionality of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38MC v Bulgaria Application 39278/98, (2005) 40 EHRR 20, [166]. 
39 R v G [2008] UKHL 37; S v Chapman 1997 (3) SA 342 (SCA); The State v Baloyi (2000) 1 SACR 
81 (CC). 
40 Opuz v Turkey (Application no. 33401/02) 9 June 2009. 
41 Opuz v Turkey [147]. 
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particular protective measures.42 Notably, however, it added, citing decisions of the 
CEDAW Committee, that:  
 
‘In any event, the Court underlines that in domestic violence cases 
perpetrators’ rights cannot supersede victims’ rights to life and to physical 
and mental integrity’.43  
 
It is striking that the countervailing rights and interests of those subject to protective 
measures received so little regard here. This is a theme to which we return at a 
number of points later in this chapter. 
 
In Opuz, the ECtHR identified women and children as ‘vulnerable groups entitled to 
State protection’.44  This is consistent with a range of decisions regarding violence 
against children.  One of these cases, A v UK,45 resulted in a clear extension of the 
criminal law by redefining the context in which the defence of ‘reasonable 
chastisement’ could be invoked.  The Court took the view that ‘beating of a child 
aged 9 year old with a garden cane applied with considerable force reached the 
severity [of treatment] prohibited by Article 3’.46  It was clear that Article 3 placed 
positive obligations on the State, and hence ‘children and other vulnerable individuals 
in particular are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, 
against such breaches of personal integrity’.47  Hence placing the burden of proof on 
the prosecution to ‘establish beyond reasonable doubt that the assault went beyond the 
limits of law punishment’ meant that the ‘law did not provide adequate protection to 
V against treatment contrary to article 3, constituting a violation of article 3’.48  A v 
UK remains one of the least popular decisions of the ECtHR in the UK, having clearly 
extended criminal law protections against parental chastisement. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The ECtHR was equally critical of the Croatian authorities for failure to implement protective 
measures that had been ordered against an abusive husband in A v Croatia (App. No. 55164/08).  Here 
the Court found a violation of the victim’s personal and psychological integrity under Article 8 of the 
Convention (right to private life).  The Court did not find sufficient evidence to ground a claim of 
discrimination against women however, and was unpersuaded that the actions were discriminatory. 
43 Opuz v Turkey [147]. 
44 Opuz v Turkey [160]. 
45 A v UK Application 25599/94 (ECtHR 23 September 1998). 
46 A v UK [21]. 
47 A v UK [22]. 
48 A v UK [23 - 24]. 
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Three further groundbreaking cases regarding domestic abuse of children gave rise to 
a significant change in tort law in the UK.49  These all involved the failure of local 
authorities to prevent gross or sexual abuse of children giving rise to potential 
breaches of Articles 3 and 8. The Court held that ‘the obligation imposed by art. 3 
requires that the State take measures to provide effective protection, in particular, of 
children and other vulnerable persons and take reasonable steps to prevent the ill-
treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge’.50 While the 
threshold of this substantive test was not met in DP, all cases rejected the rule in X v 
Bedfordshire which protected local authorities from liability in negligence in respect 
of the exercise of their statutory duties to protect children.51  The X v Bedfordshire 
rule was held to violate Article 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy) which 
requires a ‘mechanism for establishing any liability of State officials or bodies for acts 
or omissions involving the breach of their rights under the Convention’.52  The child 
protection cases demonstrate clearly how protective duties arising from international 
and regional human rights law obligations can transform the contours of domestic tort 
law, even where the implications for criminal law are not as evident.  
 
Protective duties and the right to security  
 
A range of protective duties have arisen out of the right to security in South Africa 
where the right is enshrined in the Constitution.53   The Constitutional Court and 
Supreme Court have been faced with a number of applications regarding the failure of 
police to protect individuals who have been subject to serious violence and sexual 
violence.54 As with the ECtHR in MC v Bulgaria, these cases often raise the right to 
security in conjunction with other rights such as the prohibition on gender-based 
violence in international law.  While the South African courts have accepted a broad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Z v UK Application 29392/95 (ECtHR 10 May 2001); E v UK Application 33218/96 (ECtHR 26 
November 2002); D.P v UK Application 38719/97 (ECtHR 10 October 2002). 
50 E v UK [88]. 
51 [1995] 3 AER 353. 
52 Z v UK [109]. 
53 Article 12 South African Constitution, in particular Art. 12(1)(c) ‘obliges the State directly to protect 
the right of everyone to be free from private or domestic violence’. 
54 S v Baloyi (Minister of Justice Intervening) 2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC); Rail Commuters Action Group 
v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC); Minister of Safety and Security v Van 
Duivenboden, case no. 209/2001; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) BCLR 938 
(CC); Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA). 
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duty to ‘protect the right of everyone to be free from violence’,55 they have (again like 
the ECtHR) constrained the coercive duties arising from this right by considerations 
of reasonableness, proximity and resource constraints.56  
 
This legal taming of far reaching demands for State coercion arising out of the right to 
security is welcome, but similarly to the ECtHR jurisprudence most of these cases 
have involved claims against the State in respect of its failure to act. Here it is the 
Court’s decision whether the State is at fault, and responsible for wrongs committed 
in circumstances where it has failed to arrest individuals (Carmichele), granted bail to 
suspects (Carmichele), released individual offenders or allowed offenders to escape 
(Van Eeden), or failed to secure the security of individuals on commuter trains 
(Metrorail), where there was an evident risk of harm occurring. Because these cases 
are about actionable claims and the clear attribution of responsibility, the construction 
of the duty here has been intimately connected to the South African equivalent of tort 
law, the law of delict. Hence, while the founding duty is broadly framed, the 
obligation on the State is constrained by questions of reasonableness (as is the case in 
the ECtHR’s approach to the right to life).  As stated in Van Eeden: 
 
A defendant is under a legal duty to act positively to prevent harm to the 
plaintiff if it is reasonable to expect of the defendant to have taken 
positive measures to prevent the harm. The court determines whether it is 
reasonable to have expected of the defendant to have done so by making a 
value judgment, based inter alia upon its perception of the legal 
convictions of the community and on considerations of policy. The 
question whether a legal duty exists in a particular case is thus a 
conclusion of law depending on a consideration of all the circumstances 
of the case and on the interplay of the many factors which have to be 
considered.57 
 
The delimitation of positive duties in South Africa echoes the approach taken in 
Osman and is also reflected in the ECtHR’s restricted approach to local authority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 SA Constitution Article 12(1)(c); S v Baloyi (Minister of Justice Intervening) 2000 (1) BCLR 86 
(CC).  
56 Rail Commuters Action Group  v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC). 
57 Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA) [9]. 
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liability in the child abuse cases.58  Clearly these restrictions of the protective duties 
of the State are welcome.  But, as a later part of this chapter will demonstrate, this 
approach does not always travel across to cases where the issue is one of balance 
between an individual right and the State’s protective duty.  
 
 
Positive rights and the coercive sting 
 
Having provided a brief overview of the kind of rights claims that can result in 
positive duties related to the scope of the criminal law (and tort or delict law) and the 
way in which criminal justice institutions behave, we might reflect for a moment on 
how these duties can be properly characterized.  
 
Human rights theorists argue persuasively that a theory of rights only as limits on 
State action is premised on a set of misplaced conceptions. Fredman argues that a 
conception of rights as limitations is premised on ‘a conception of freedom as absence 
of interference’ and ‘a characterization of the State as separate from and opposed to 
the individual’. In contrast, values of ‘substantive equality’, ‘social solidarity’ and 
participative democracy gives rise to a strong claim that rights give rise to a range of 
duties which involve ‘positive action’ as well as ‘restraint’.59 Fredman is joined by a 
range of contemporary rights theorists who are agreed that rights go beyond 
subjective individual entitlements that place limitations on the State or other duty 
bearers, and that rights incorporate the notion that States or other actors have duties to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The South African and ECtHR approach is also echoed in India where a series of cases have 
established that the State could be held liable for negligent acts resulting in the violation of the right to 
life (what many refer now to as a ‘constitutional tort’). See: National Human Rights Commission v. 
State of Arunachal Pradesh and another AIR 1996 SC 1234; M Hongray v. Union of India AIR 1984 
SC 1026; Challa Ramkonda Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1990) ACJ 668; R Gandhi v. Union of 
India AIR 1989 Mad 205; M/s Inderpuri General Stores v. Union of India AIR 1992 J&K 11; Manjit 
Singh Sawhney v. Union of India 2005 Indlaw DEL 379; Ken Cooper-Stephenson, ‘The Emergence of 
Constitutional Torts Worldwide’, Presented at the Conference on Comparative Constitutionalism on 
12. 12. 2005, University of Kwazulu, Natal, South Africa. 
59 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP, 2008) 1. 
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respect and protect rights and not merely a duty to desist from violating them.60   In 
the words of Shue:  ‘taking rights seriously means taking duties seriously’.61  
 
These moral claims are hard to refute, and it is not the objective here to take to task 
those who have proposed them.  Even if we do not accept these foundational moral 
arguments, any analysis of the analytical structure of rights naturally leads us to 
accept that rights give rise to positive duties.  The work on the structure of rights by 
theorists such as Hohfeld and Jellinek direct us just as comfortably to the conclusion 
that positive duties are an inevitable consequence of the recognition of a right.62  So to 
avoid any doubt on this question, the claim here is not that there is a foundational or 
analytical problem with the recognition of positive duties arising out of human rights. 
 
Neither is the claim here that positive duties inevitably result in coercion. Many 
positive duties which relate to the criminal law and criminal justice agencies are not 
directed towards the coercion of perpetrators of harm.  For example, much of the due 
diligence requirement with respect to gender violence is directed towards systemic 
reforms required for the sensitive treatment of victims of sexual violence.  Moreover, 
the term coercion can encompass a range of interferences with the liberty of 
individuals which are not all of equal gravity. A system of taxation that distributes 
resources within society so as to protect the dignity rights of the worst off necessarily 
entails some limitations on the property rights of all individuals in that society.  This 
normally involves law enforcement and the coercion of individuals who breach these 
rules. These kinds of coercive activities which arise indirectly from the assertion of a 
general human right such as dignity or equality are less the concern here, than those 
protective duties which arise directly from the assertion of a right which involve the 
sharp end of the State’s criminal law enforcement mechanism or military apparatus. 
We are concerned here with the forms of coercion directed at perpetrators of harm (or 
potential perpetrators of harm) which restrict rights and liberties to a far greater extent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights:  The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic 
Rights (OUP, 2007); A Sen Development as Freedom (Knopf, 1999); H Shue Basic Rights: 
Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (2nd edn, Princeton University Press, 1996); J Waldron 
‘Socio-Economic Rights and Theories of Justice (Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series 
Working Paper No. 10-79, November 2010).  
61 Shue (n 60 above) 167. 
62 G Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte (2nd edn, Tübingen 1905); WN Hohfeld 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1923 New Haven Yale University 
Press); R Alexy A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by J Rivers) (OUP, 2002) 169. 
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than the normal general limitations we might experience by living in a fair, socially 
democratic, and redistributive society.  
 
So what should we call these duties?  Many of the duties examined in this chapter are 
well known to human rights lawyers, and even criminal lawyers.  But they are not 
recognized as ‘coercive duties’.  They are referred to as ‘protective duties’63 or as the 
Germans refer to it ‘Schutzpflicthen’.64 This descriptor is incomplete.  When the right 
to life gives rise to a duty on the State it often engages both a protective duty directed 
towards the individual at risk of harm, as well as a coercive duty directed at the 
perpetrator or potential perpetrator of the harm.  The duty frequently cuts both ways.65 
While some protective duties give rise to non-coercive duties, such as the training of 
officers in sensitivity around domestic violence victims, other protective duties 
require the State to coerce individuals who harm or individuals who are at risk of 
harming, in order to fulfill the duty. To call these duties protective duties alone risks 
masking the coercive sting in its tail. 
 
Of course, coercive duties are not necessarily a bad thing.  Most would argue that they 
are in fact a very good thing, because they create requirements on the State which are 
essential to the protection of others.  Certainly, coercive duties that are correlative 
upon rights as fundamental as life or dignity can constitute what we can all 
comfortably recognize as ‘justified coercion’.66   Moreover, coercive duties are also 
mechanisms by which the State enforces the correlative duties upon individuals not to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 A Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2004) 15 – 22, 127-30, 181; J 
McBride, ‘Protecting Life: a Positive Obligation to Help’ 24 (1999) European Law Review Human 
Rights Survey HR/43. 
64 Schutzpflichten in Germany have commonly been used to justify extension of the criminal law.  Most 
controversially, Schutzpflichten have been used to protect the unborn foetus (BVerfGE 39, 1).  See J 
Isensee 'Das Grundrecht als Abwehrrecht und als staatliche Schutzpflicht' J Isensee and P Kirchhoff, 
(edd), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band IV: Allgemeine 
Grundrechtslehren (Müller Heidelberg 1992) 143.  As the FCC is equivocal on this matter, I will not 
here enter the ongoing debate over whether Schutzpflichten should be seen as objective State duties or 
as correlative duties derived from subjective individual rights to State protection; see R Alexy A 
Theory of Constitutional Rights (trans. Julian Rivers OUP Oxford 2002) 301f. 
65 This is not to argue that the coercion of a perpetrator or potential perpetrator automatically results in 
the protection of the subject of the harm.  Certainly, in most cases that come to Court the harm has 
already occurred, and where it has not already occurred we cannot be sure that the coercion of potential 
perpetrators will in actual fact result in the protection of those at risk of harm. 
66 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986). 
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breach the rights of others.67 The State is indeed required to restrain individuals from 
breaching the rights of others.  To this extent, coercive duties can easily be reconciled 
with Ashworth’s ‘liberal theory of criminalisation’ in that they anchor coercion in 
relation to the harm to others.   
 
To be clear, the purpose of this chapter is not to reject or critique the existence of 
coercive duties. It is more to name them, and thereby to highlight their existence, 
rather than sublimating them within the comforting label of ‘protective duties’.  The 
motive here is to raise some questions and concerns about how coercive duties may 
be framed.  While we can accept that rights give rise to justified coercion by the State, 
or that the necessary correlative of a right is a duty on individuals to respect the rights 
of others and the State is justified in enforcing these, it is crucial that we understand 
how to shape the scope of coercive duties. The key questions that arise when a 
coercive duty is established is how much coercion is required to fulfill the right or 
rights of individuals at harm, or at risk of harm.  To put this another way, where the 
State is under a protective duty as a consequence of a positive right, it is critical to 
establish how much coercion must be exercised in order to fulfill the duty, what form 
that coercion should take in order to fulfill the duty, what the relation is, and how we 
strike a balance, between the rights of the person subjected to harm (or at risk of 
harm) and the perpetrator (or potential perpetrator) of the harm.  
 
A short case example may help demonstrate the problem here.  The case is R v G.68 G, 
a 15 year old boy, had sexual intercourse with R when she was 12. He agreed to 
submit a guilty plea on the basis that R had willingly agreed to have intercourse with 
him and that he honestly believed she was 15 as she had told him so. R agreed to G’s 
plea and the prosecutor was invited to drop the charge.  G was nevertheless convicted 
and sentenced under section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape of a child under 
13).  G appealed arguing that he could have been charged with a less serious offence 
under section 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (child sex offences committed by 
children or young persons).  Part of G’s argument was that his rights under Article 8 
of the ECHR included a right not to be subject to undue stigma and practical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 L Lazarus et al, The Relationship Between Rights and Responsibilities (2009) 18/09 Ministry of 
Justice Research Series. 
68 R v G [2008] UKHL 37. 
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interference with his right to private life.  G argued that the choice of the more serious 
offence of rape by the prosecutor and his subsequent conviction was therefore a 
disproportionate interference with his Article 8 rights.   On the other hand, the 
Supreme Court was aware that the ECHR has developed a set of positive duties with 
regard to the protection of rape victims or victims of sexual violence that arise out of 
Article 8 and 3.69  The case involved a number of arguments, some of which veered 
away from the competing rights arising from Article 8, but the key passage on this 
question came from Baroness Hale who had already pointed to the countervailing 
positive obligations that the ECHR had developed regarding the State’s protection of 
rape victims or potential rape victims:70 
 
In effect, therefore, the real complaint is that the appellant has been 
convicted of an offence bearing the label ‘rape’. Parliament has very 
recently decided that this is the correct label to apply to this activity. In 
my view this does not engage the Art. 8 rights of the appellant at all, but if 
it does, it is entirely justified. The concept of private life “covers the 
physical and moral integrity of the person, including his or her sexual life” 
(X and Y v Netherlands at [22]). This does not mean that every sexual 
relationship, however brief or unsymmetrical, is worthy of respect, nor is 
every sexual act which a person wishes to perform. It does mean that the 
physical and moral integrity of the complainant, vulnerable by reason of 
her age if nothing else, was worthy of respect. The state would have been 
open to criticism if it did not provide her with adequate protection. This it 
attempts to do by a clear rule that children under 13 are incapable of 
giving any sort of consent to sexual activity and treating penile 
penetration as a most serious form of such activity. This does not in my 
view amount to a lack of respect for the private life of the penetrating 
male.71 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 X and Y v Netherlands Application 8978/80 (1986) 8 EHRR 235; MC v Bulgaria Application 
39278/98 (2005) 40 EHRR 20.  See in general L Lazarus, The Human Rights Framework Relating to 
the Handling, Investigation and Prosecution of Rape Complaints, Annex A to the Stern Report on The 
Handling of Rape Complaints 2010. 
70 Reference to X and Y v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235 in R v G [UKHL] 37 [41]. 
71 R v G [2008] UKHL 37, [54]. 
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Baroness Hale’s observations demonstrate the difficulty of framing and balancing the 
competing rights and duties arising in this case. Article 8 has frequently been 
deployed to protect the private life or sexual autonomy of individuals.  This notion of 
sexual autonomy cuts both ways. On the one hand, Article 8 was deployed in the 
decriminalisation of homosexuality.72 On the other hand, Article 8 has been used to 
require ‘practical and effective protection’ by the criminal law of those vulnerable to 
sexual violence.73  The difficulty that Baroness Hale had to confront was how to 
reconcile these two parts of the right to sexual autonomy, and to frame the duties on 
the State in response to these rights.  According to Baroness Hale G’s article 8 rights 
had almost no countervailing weight against the State’s duty under Article 8 to protect 
potential victims of rape. The justification she provides for her view is shallow. The 
State was duty bound to protect victims of rape, but this did not in her view ‘amount 
to a lack of respect for the private life of the penetrating male’. The difficulty here 
was that the duty of general protection against the population at large is being 
deployed to justify the coercion of a particular individual in a particular way.  There 
was no consideration by Baroness Hale of the individual circumstances of the case, or 
for that matter of the rights of the individual in question.  
 
To be sure, R v G provides a a crisp example of the dilemmas and complexity that 
arise where the State is both under a coercive duty regarding perpetrators of sexual 
offences, while also subject to their countervailing rights to autonomy.  How are we 
to know whether the choice of the more serious offence in this case constitutes the 
best balance? Where the Court has to take such competing rights and duties into 
account, the answer can only be found if we understand the contours of the coercive 
duty to which these rights give rise, and the extent of the countervailing negative 
rights protections. In the R v G decision, the cursory balancing act was insufficient.  It 
rested on broad brush rhetorical assertions of the protective duties of the state, and 
included almost no analysis of the content of the competing right.   
 
The rhetorical assertion of coercive duties within the law needs also to be read against 
the background of an increasing rhetorical use of rights to justify coercive measures 
by politicians and State actors internationally. As noted earlier, the implications of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Dudgeon v UK Application 7526/76 (1982) 4 EHRR 149. 
73 X and Y v Netherlands Application 8978/80, (1986) 8 EHRR 235. 
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legal language of this kind cannot be confined to courts of law. We also need to be 
concerned about the extra-legal implications of broad rhetorical assertions of coercive 
duties inside the Courts, and the concomitant risk of coercive overreach.   As I have 
argued elsewhere in more depth, this has been well demonstrated by the growing 
rhetoric of the right to security. 
 
The right to security, political rhetoric, and the risk of coercive overreach 
 
Coercive duties are even harder to frame when the right that underpins them is 
underdetermined, and the potential for their political exploitation is even higher.  The 
right to security is such a right. In a recent piece, I analyse references to the ‘right to 
security’ in the English speaking press globally over the last 10 years.74 This shows 
that assertions of the right to security can imply, and have been increasingly 
politically exploited to mean, increasing police powers, powers of surveillance, 
powers of pre-trial detention, and pre-emptive measures aimed at risk prevention.   
This right is also frequently used to legitimate invasions or incursions into countries 
seen to be a threat to security.75 
 
As in South Africa, the right to security is enshrined in a number of domestic 
constitutions internationally while also being expressed within international law,76 
and the jurisprudence around this right has generated a range of potential claims. 
Importantly, the right to security has gained an increasing currency in political debate 
around the world. The political currency of the right to security has not been 
overlooked by political actors in their quest to legitimate and develop various security 
measures since 9/11.77  The rhetoric has been deployed consistently with respect to 
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the Middle East78 and North Korea. 79 It has also been engaged to justify tightening 
anti-terrorism measures or even to justify military invasion or responses with respect 
to Afghanistan,80 Kosovo,81 Pakistan82 and, in Columbia’s case, Ecuador.83  In the war 
on terror, the language of the right to security is ubiquitous.84  
 
Political rhetoric also manifests in the claim that the right to security, cast as ‘the 
protection of life and limb’ is ‘the basic right on which all others are based’.85  These 
attempts to cast the right to security as a meta-right, and to reorder the priority of 
rights, hold the risk that rights themselves will be securitized.86  In other words, rights 
to autonomy and liberty may themselves be viewed as a product of the meta-right to 
security.  Or as Waldron argues, we may become so preoccupied with delivering 
security as the precondition to liberty that we end up with perfect security and very 
little liberty.87 
 
Part of the difficulty with the development of the right to security is that it has been 
taken to mean not just freedom from physical violence in the most core sense,88 but 
also a range of other values such as ‘personal autonomy’, ‘physical and psychological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 As George W. Bush declared: ‘I can understand the deep anger and anguish of the Israeli people. 
You've lived too long with fear and funerals, having to avoid markets and public transportation, and 
forced to put armed guards in kindergarten classrooms. The Palestinian Authority has rejected your 
offered hand and trafficked with terrorists. You have a right to a normal life. You have a right to 
security. And I deeply believe that you need a reformed, responsible Palestinian partner to achieve that 
security’. George Bush, ‘Remarks on the Middle East’, speech from the Rose Garden of the White 
House, 24 June 2002. Full text available at CNN.com http://www-
cgi.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/06/24/bush.mideast.speech/index.html (last accessed 14 September 
2010) (emphasis added). George Bush has been joined by Barak Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy, Vladimir 
Putin, Franco Fini, David Milliband, and Colin Powell (amongst others) who have all asserted the 
collective right to security of the Israeli people, 
79 See The Associated Press, ‘Non-Aligned meeting backs calls for Iraq to disarm; Malaysia warns 
attack on Iraq would be considered a “war against Muslims”’, 23 February 2003.  
80 E Cochrane, ‘Troops deserve our support’, Carstairs Courier (Alberta), 6 November 2007. 
81 The Vancouver Sun, ‘Yeltsin's final fling: The Russian leader, often portrayed in the West as a 
boorish drunk, had substance that belied his unvarnished style’, 27 January 2001.  
82 The Press Trust of India, ‘Pak should give firm assurance against abetting terrorism’, 30 December 
2001.  
83 BBC Worldwide Monitoring, ‘Colombia defends its incursion into Ecuador’ 23 March 2008. 
84 For UK and EU examples see: European Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and 
Security ‘EU counterterrorism strategy’  European Parliament, Sept. 5, 2007, Speech/07/505. J Reid, 
‘Rights, Security Must Be Balanced’, Associated Press Online 16 August 2006. 
85 Full text of speech reported by BBC News ‘Reid Urges Human Rights Shake Up’12 May 2007, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6648849.stm (last accessed 30 August 2011).  
86 Lazarus, 'The Right to Security - Securing Rights or Securitizing Rights' (n 46 above) 
87 J Waldron, ‘Security as a Basic Right (after 9/11)’ in Torture, Terror and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for 
the White House  (OUP 2010) 166. 
88 South African Constitution, art 12; Northern Ireland Draft Bill of Rights. 
	   22	  
integrity and basic human dignity’.89  The right has also been described by the United 
Nations as a right to human security which includes ‘the right of people to live in 
freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair’ and to enjoy ‘freedom from fear 
and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully 
develop their human potential’.90 In short, the range of goods and interests that the 
right to security can protect internationally is now so extensive that it could in theory 
be deployed to protect most things we want in life.  This porous boundary to the right 
to security leaves open a greater potential for political and State legitimation of 
coercive overreach where the right is deployed.  This is why I have argued strongly 
for a legal approach to the right to security that restricts the correlative duty to coerce 
to one that involves ‘the development of structures and institutions capable of 
responding to and minimizing ‘critical and pervasive threats’ to human safety, namely 
‘absence from harm in the most core physical sense of harm to person’.91   
 
For the purposes of the argument here, the example of the right to security is raised to 
demonstrate how particular rights claims may permeate political rhetoric and 
legitimate strong coercive measures. It is the courts, I argue, that should be tempering 
broad brush rhetorical claims made in the name of the right to security, and the 
potential correlative duties that may flow from them. 
 
Rhetoric and the risk of coercive overreach in the courts 
 
As R v G demonstrated above, in cases where the fault of the State is not at issue the 
duty to coerce is not always adequately restricted.  In contrast to the State liability 
cases, coercive duties have been broadly framed and deployed to legitimate criminal 
law measures that are highly coercive, where the rights of offenders are at issue. This 
is also demonstrated in the South African case of Chapman,92 where an appeal of a 14 
year prison sentence of a rapist was based on the fact that the defendant was 
subsequently brain damaged from a serious head injury. Here the Court framed their 
duty to coerce as follows:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Canada: Rodriquez v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1993] 3 SCR 519. 
90 United Nations General Assembly 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. 
91 Lazarus, 'The Right to Security - Securing Rights or Securitizing Rights' (n 46 above)  
92 S v Chapman 1997 (3) SA 342 (SCA). 
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The rights to dignity, to privacy, and the integrity of every person are 
basic to the ethos of the Constitution and to any defensible civilization. ... 
Women in this country are entitled to the protection of these rights. They 
have a legitimate claim to walk peacefully on the streets, to enjoy their 
shopping and their entertainment, to go and come from work, and to enjoy 
the peace and tranquility of their homes without the fear, the apprehension 
and the insecurity which constantly diminishes the quality and enjoyment 
of their lives. … The appellant showed no respect for their rights. He 
prowled the street and shopping malls and in a short period of one week 
he raped three young women, who were unknown to him. He deceptively 
pretended to care for them by giving them lifts and then proceeded to rape 
them callously and brutally, after threatening them with a knife. At no 
stage, did he show the slightest remorse. …The Courts are under a duty to 
send a clear message to the accused, to other potential rapists and to the 
community: We are determined to protect the equality, dignity and 
freedom of all women, and we shall show no mercy to those who seek to 
invade those rights.93 
  
The questions of whether the appellant deserved his sentence, or whether it was 
proportionate to the gravity of the crime, or whether the case can be used to imply a 
harsher sentence for rapists, is not our primary concern here.  What is our concern is 
the mode of legitimation deployed by the Supreme Court. A broad-brush language of 
rights and duties is harnessed with great effect to legitimate highly coercive measures, 
which the Court describes itself as duty bound to implement.  The rights are very 
broadly framed, as is the correlative duty of the Court, and there is no proper 
discussion about the nature of the duty, and how it can be framed or narrowed.  There 
is also no consideration of the possibility that coercion in this instance may have a 
very limited impact on the rights of the victims or potential victims.  It cannot be 
shown that the type and length of sentence (and whether it occurs in a prison or secure 
hospital) is directly related to the way in which rights of those at risk of harm might 
be protected. Chapman and R v G argue that serious criminalization of such harmful 
acts which result in harsh sentences provide a deterrent effect on potential offenders.  
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But this is an empirical claim about which many criminologists are rightly wary,94 
and which in any event raises serious questions about using the individual offenders 
in these particular cases as a means to an end. 
 
In the cases where actions are brought regarding State liability, the link between the 
actions of the State body and the breach of the duty was the primary question:  was 
the State at fault for not coercing the individuals in question.   This restricted duty is 
centered around question of proximity and reasonableness with respect to the State’s 
assessment of the risk of harm. But in cases like R v G and Chapman, the idea that the 
State might be duty bound to protect individuals from the harmful acts of other 
individuals in clearly defined circumstances, transmutes into a broad-brush 
legitimation directed at the coercion of the individual offender.  These legitimations 
involve very little rights analysis, and the language in the courtroom sounds not 
dissimilar to the kind of political rhetoric surrounding the right to security. It is also 
noteworthy that the coercive duty is far narrower when it applies to the State’s 
wrongdoing, than when it applies to the individual offenders wrongdoing. This 
suggests that the risk of coercive overreach is higher where the criminal law is applied 
to individuals, than when the rights are invoked against the State.  The risk of 
coercive overreach is also higher where the reasoning rests on a rhetorical assertion of 
rights and correlative coercive duties which are not decisive to the resolution of the 
case, where no countervailing rights are taken into account, and no systematic 
analysis of the rights and duties in play is undertaken. 
 
Balancing coercive duties 
 
The ECtHR stipulated in Osman that coercive duties had to be balanced against 
countervailing rights of the accused.  But the mechanism by which that balance takes 
place is opaque, or even non-existent, in the cases discussed where the coercion of the 
individual is at issue.   The matter isn’t helped by throwaway lines found in Opuz v 
Turkey where the Court, admittedly facing very extreme circumstances, underlined 
‘that in domestic violence cases perpetrators’ rights cannot supersede victims’ human 
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rights to life and to physical and mental integrity’.95  The balance has to be struck 
regardless of the gravity of the harm in question.  The right cannot merely be 
suspended in face of the competing protective duty.  It must at the very least receive 
due regard.  
 
In the Baloyi case in the South African Constitutional Court,96 Albie Sachs was clear 
that such a balance is unavoidable. This case dealt with the allegation that the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act 1993 reversed the burden of proof, placing the 
onus on the accused. The State argued that if the legislative provision in question 
could be read this way, it was justified as a consequence of the constitutional 
guarantee of the right to security, as well as international obligations regarding gender 
violence.  Sachs noted that the ‘Court faces the novel and complex task of 
establishing the appropriate balance between the state’s constitutional duty to provide 
effective remedies against domestic violence, and its simultaneous obligation to 
respect the constitutional rights to a fair trial of those who might be affected by the 
measures taken’.97  When concluding that the legislation in question could not be read 
to place a reverse burden of proof on the accused, he argued: 
 
The Constitution embodies many enduring common law principles, 
especially those associated with personal freedom. The Constitution also 
articulates, however, new values and contains different emphases. As 
pointed out above, the Constitution and South Africa’s international 
obligations require effective measures to deal with the gross denial of 
human rights resulting from pervasive domestic violence. At the same 
time the Constitution insists that no-one should be arbitrarily deprived of 
freedom or convicted without a fair trial. The problem, then, is to find the 
interpretation of the text which best fits the Constitution and balances the 
duty of the state to deal effectively with domestic violence with its duty to 
guarantee accused persons the protection involved in a fair trial.98 
 
Sachs’s judgment is an exemplar of the sort of reasoning that needs to be deployed 
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when faced with the competing imperatives of coercive duties on the one hand, and 
negative rights on the other.  But perhaps an even more compelling example of an 
insistence on the need for a balance between the State’s protective duties and the 
rights of individuals is to found in the German Aviation case.99   The German Federal 
Constitutional Court (FCC) struck down powers under the Aviation Security Act to 
shoot down aircrafts which had been hijacked with the intention of using the aircraft 
‘as weapons in crimes against human lives’.  The judges argued that the measures 
violated the essence of the right to life and human dignity of the innocent passengers 
on the plane who had been made into mere objects of State action.  Importantly, the 
FCC rejected the Government’s argument that the relevant powers under the Aviation 
Security Act could be justified as a consequence of the State’s protective duties.  It 
argued thus: 
 
Finally, § 14.3 of the Aviation Security Act also cannot be justified by 
invoking the state’s duty to protect those against whose lives the aircraft 
… is intended to be used. In complying with such duties of protection, the 
state and its bodies have a broad margin of assessment, valuation and 
organisation … Unlike fundamental rights in their function as subjective 
rights of defence [against the state], the state’s duties to protect which 
result from the objective contents of the fundamental rights are, in 
principle, not defined ... How the state bodies comply with such duties of 
protection is to be decided, as a matter of principle, by themselves on their 
own responsibility ... This also applies to their duty to protect human life. 
It is true that especially as regards this protected interest, in cases with a 
particular combination of circumstances, if effective protection of life 
cannot be achieved otherwise, the possibilities of choosing the means of 
complying with the duty of protection can be restricted to the choice of 
one particular means ... The choice, however, can only be between means 
the use of which is in harmony with the constitution.100 
 
Given the extreme facts of the German Aviation case, and the explicit reasoning 
deployed by the FCC, this case is a crisp example of both the necessity for, and 
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framework within which, the balance between coercive duties and individual rights 
must be struck.  Far from the broad brush approach of R v G and Chapman, and even 
the dicta in Opuz v Turkey, we see here a court insistent on the necessity of holding 
both the individual right in play and the protective duty asserted.  The case explicitly 
argues that coercive duties are neither absolute, nor so prescriptive as to require one 
particular kind of coercion on individuals.101  On the contrary, protective duties are 
broadly defined giving the State a range of alternative routes to their fulfillment, and 




This is a modest contribution to the question of the relationship between human rights 
and criminal justice which builds upon Ashworth’s work.  It asks for a clearer 
understanding of positive rights as potentially leading to sharply coercive activity by 
the State. It also raises some concerns about the rhetorical expression of rights in this 
context both within the Courts and without. While the case law surrounding the 
liability of States in respect of their failure to protect individuals from harm by other 
individuals has managed to contain the reach of coercive duties (or at least the 
conditions in which a breach of that duty will be found), there are examples of cases 
like R v G and Chapman that demonstrate the potential for coercive overreach upon 
individuals subject to such coercion. We risk overlooking the tensions here if we 
continue to refer to these positive rights claims only as protective duties.  We must 
not lose sight of the coercive sting in the tail of positive duties, and the necessity of 
deploying frameworks in which countervailing rights claims can be weighed in the 
balance.  We must also not overlook the potential for rights to intensify and expand 
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